Appendix. Scotus’ extended annotation to n.41

On the contrary. The same thing is principle of ‘producing’ and of ‘producing necessarily’; therefore if there is infinity of will - or rather, an infinite will - it is not of itself a principle of producing necessarily, therefore not of producing absolutely, nor of communicating nature, because the nature cannot be communicated except necessarily; therefore in the solution of the question [n.9], and in the solution of the first doubt [n.31], one ought to speak about the object as here in the second doubt [sc. that the object does not give necessity to the act of willing, n.40]; there is confirmation because even an infinite will is not a principle of producing love of a finite object, - otherwise there will either be many Holy Spirits, or there will be one love produced for every creature (which you deny, n.41), because then they would be necessarily loved. I concede, then, that the reason for the solution here [n.9], and likewise about the Word as concerns the intellect, and the whole reason set down above in distinction 2 question 6 [I d.2 nn.221, 226], only conclude by taking, along with the will here [about the Holy Spirit] and along with the intellect there [about the Word], the productive principle, namely the object, without which it does not produce, just as it does not operate either.

In another way and better (immediately after ‘It does not seem’ footnote to n.49), because, by absolutely adding nothing to the idea of infinite will, the conclusion follows that it has a first object infinite and always present, nay always actually willed, and nothing else is necessarily required for its act; and     therefore it has no contingent act, although it contingently passes to some object on which its act does not depend (about this in distinctions 38 and 39).

If it be said to the ‘I concede that the reason, etc     .’ [above, in the first paragraph of this annotation] that the will is not the principle of producing unless it has the object present to it (which object is the co-principle of producing), and that it cannot be the ‘principle’ when it has any object whatever but precisely when it has the first object present to it and along with that one (and this either because, before the presence of the secondary object, it has an adequate production, because it has it with the first object, but it has no power for another production beyond the adequate one; or, secondly, because an infinite principle does not require any finite principle producing along with it, but the secondary object is finite; or, thirdly, because a necessarily productive principle does not have as co-productive principle that to which it has no necessary relation, but the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to a secondary object; or, fourthly, because in these cases the general supposition is true, namely that the will is a principle of producing that necessarily requires the object as co-productive, just as does also the intellect [this is valid in d.7 n.42]), - hence it was said in distinction 2 that perfect memory, which is the complete principle of the speaking, is the intellect possessing the actually intelligible object present to itself [I d.1 n.221]; so perfect will is a will possessing the lovable object actually presented to it through intelligence [I d.1 n.226].

But as to what is added [in the previous paragraph] about the difference between the first object (that it is co-productive) and the second (that is not co-productive), this is doubtful both in the case of the intellect and in the case of the will - nor do any of the causes assigned [in the previous paragraph] seem sufficient; not the first, because either it is understood of production adequate in extension, and then the question is begged, or adequate in intension, and then the ‘but.. .beyond the adequate one’ is false (as is plain in the case of operation, because it has, beyond a thus adequate operation about the first object, power for operation about a second object). Nor the second reason, because I want the second object not to be co-productive but the first object to be co-productive, not only of knowledge of itself - which is present formally - but of knowledge of the second object, which is present in it virtually; so that, just as the divine memory precisely contains the first object formally and the second object is only in the memory virtually (because it is in the first object), and yet the memory is the reason for understanding the operation about both objects, so also is it the idea for producing declarative knowledge of both objects - not indeed a knowledge proceeding from both objects but from the infinite one only, yet making both objects clear through the object which is first formally and has the second in itself virtually (so also about inspiriting); again, [the second seems insufficient because] the will in its first production does not require a co-productive principle save an infinite one; whence, then, is its imperfection proved if in the second production it were to require a finite co-productive principle? (response: although sometimes it co-acts with the creature, yet it never necessarily requires it, - for its being as principle would be imperfect; but the first instance stands, that ‘only the first object is co-productive of double word and love’ [sc. word and love of God and of creature]). The third reason is not probative, because just as will operates about an object to which it is related contingently - yet in respect of that operation the quasi-principle is only the first object which has a respect contingently to the second - why cannot it be so about production? Again, it is not conclusive about the word; again, the being well-pleased is necessary.

Note: in anything in which there is a perfect productive principle, unpreventable and not dependent on anything else, the principle can produce a term in that thing unless it is repugnant to the term to be produced by it, - and likewise it cannot produce a term in it if it is repugnant to that term to be produced by it; for each of these the major seems immediate. Or thus: in anything in which there is a perfect principle before the term is produced, it is not repugnant to the term to be produced by it,Note by Scotus: “‘before in duration’ is plain in the first minor, ‘before in nature’ is doubtful, and it is directed to the intended proposition; ‘before in origin’ causes no difficulty for the intended proposition, because the minor of the third syllogism [see in a later paragraph in the text] is only about ‘before in nature’, as is plain, - but by taking the first minor about prior in origin, there seems to be a begging of the question and the minor is the same as the conclusion. - The remark about ‘before’ is not cogent here [sc. in d.10], as is plain here [footnote to n.9], but it is valid in distinction 11 [I d.11 q.1 n.2] ‘About the Son’.” ¹¹⁸ - and likewise, it cannot be produced by it if it is not in it before the term is produced; each minor seems immediate. First conclusion: anything in which there is a productive perfect principle before the term is produced can by such a principle produce the term; second conclusion: anything in which there is no principle before the term is produced cannot produce the term.Note by Scotus: “[not] at the same time, therefore the Word does not speak itself, - nor posteriorly, therefore the Holy Spirit does not generate.” ¹¹⁹

Further in this way. Let the first conclusion be the major and let the minor be thus: ‘perfect memory is a perfect productive principle of a knowledge declarative of the object, a knowledge reducing it both formally in the memory and virtually in the object’; therefore what has a perfect memory can produce knowledge of this or of that, if it has it before knowledge of another is produced. Make a similar syllogism about perfect will and love.

Let the third syllogism (because the two first are counted as one and the two second as one) be as follows: let the last conclusion be the major; let the minor be this:

‘the whole Trinity has perfect memory before declarative knowledge of the creature is produced’, from the first question of the second book [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15], because in the first instant of nature there is completed the whole origin simply of the persons, and the knowledge of the creature is in the second moment of nature; therefore the whole Trinity produces declarative knowledge of the secondary object. Similarly about will and love.

The consequent seems false, because either the Trinity produces it [declarative knowledge of the creature] in any person at all, and then in the Father there will be something produced, - or in determinate, produced persons, with whose productions these productions are consonant (to wit, knowledge of the creature in the Son and love and of the creature in the Holy Spirit), and it follows that there is in the Son something from the Holy Spirit, and also that the Son will produce something in himself and the Holy Spirit something in himself. Therefore, by avoiding the inferred conclusion, one or other of the three minors must be denied. If the first is denied, the denial is about the ‘before in nature’, because that stands in the same degree of origin (where however there is no production), or a gloss is made to the effect that it is true if, ‘before the first producible term is produced’, the productive principle exists in it, not if it is before the second is produced, and the reason is that the second term is in the same degree of origin as the first; both responses seem to be the same (at least it is conceded that the Word is declarative knowledge of the creature and the Holy Spirit is love of the creature, although not produced by the Trinity; the contrary is in distinction 18 ‘About gift’ and 27 ‘About the Word’ [I d.27 qq.1-3 n.24; d.18 was left blank in the Ordinatio]). If the second minor about the secondary object is denied, the difficulty here treated of returns - above at ‘If it be said to the ‘I concede that the reason,’ etc.’ - and then one must speak differently about will than about memory ‘because to the will the secondary object is actually presented through intelligence’ (response: the second object does not have of itself, as does the first object, a reason for being lovable). The third minor only has force about the ‘before’ (just as does the first minor): for it is plain that it is not true of the ‘before’ in origin; about ‘nature’ it is doubtful if there is only a difference of reason between the production of the Word declaring the first object and of the Word declaring the second object, because a difference of reason is not sufficient for the order of nature.

One should note for the three syllogisms posited above that, although the minor of the first syllogism is denied of ‘before in a way other than in origin’ in the case of divine reality, and by this, a, seems to be excluded all force of arguing ‘whom about what’ (because ‘before in origin’ is the same as the conclusion), yet there still remains the difficulty about the productive principle, which was touched on here above, at the beginning - namely about the secondary object - because either the major (on which you altogether rely in the question about productions) will be false or it will be difficult for it not to be extended to the secondary object; but once, b, it is conceded that it is extended to it, then there is lost, c, the point in the first distinction of the second book ‘about the creature in intelligible being, that it is from the whole Trinity’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15] (because from that which knowledge of the creature productively is, from that the creature as understood is produced), there is lost, d, the point ‘about the relation of the secondary object to God’s knowing’ in the question about ideas [I d.35 q. un n.10], there is lost, e, the point ‘about the relation of the Word and the Holy Spirit to creatures’ in distinctions 18 and 27 of the first book [same reference as before], there is lost, f, the fact that ‘the Holy Spirit is not necessarily love of the creature’ [I d.32 qq.1-2 n.14] (and it will be necessary to say that it is necessarily love of being well-pleased, although not love of existing), and then there will be lost, g, the point in distinction 8 ‘against the philosophers, about the non-necessity of the creature’ [I d.8 n.274], - and then returns, h, the point there ‘about being well-pleased’ [ibid.], and the first argument in the first question of the second book stands [that if there were only one person, it could produce everything possible, II d.1 q.1 n.1], the point about the respect of the first object is not valid [ibid. n.9], and the Holy Spirit will not as freely love the creature as the Father does (because love is from production), nor will the Word understand by virtue of memory as it is in himself but as it is in the Father.

To these remarks. First to a: the principle which of its idea is of a nature to exit first in act of really producing, in real subsistence, proves that its productive principle is before in origin, that is ‘without which there is no other’, and from this is proved that from him there is another (so about the Holy Spirit, because he is from the Father and the Son, distinction 11 of the first book); likewise, the product, which is of a nature to be produced in real subsistence before in another, is that ‘without which there is no other product’, - therefore ‘from which there is another product’ (thus the three persons, in relation to creatures in outward existence). I concede therefore that the person taken in real subsistence (as he has everything, whatever order they possess in him) is really productive of the second person (likewise taken in the way that everything is in him), yet in each there is a distinction between what is first in him - namely that by which he is a divine person - and what is as it were adventitious to the person as already quasiconstituted, of which sort is everything in comparison with the second object.

I concede b and likewise c, save that (according to what was said before in a) the three persons, in existence simply of divine person, precede in order of nature the understanding of the creature, and precede, as a result, the creature in its intelligible existence; this antecedent indeed is true (there, in the first distinction of the second book [same reference as before]), but the consequent is denied, ‘therefore creatures are produced by the Trinity in understood existence’; the reason for the denial is this, that, just as operation about the second object is really different (however it is so, whether essentially or subsistently) from the operation about the first object, not so production about the latter from production about the former; therefore it cannot be of another that is really producing in this way and in that; therefore only the Father speaks the word of the creature, just as only he speaks the Word of his essence. A confirmation is that, just as this operative principle has one operation adequate to itself not only intensively but also extensively, that is, about everything that is virtually in it, so it has, insofar as it is productive, one production adequate in both ways, because neither is repugnant to one product. Another confirmation is that the knowledge, whether as operation or as product, can only be of the same first term, - not of others, save as they are secondary; therefore no knowledge can be produced which is immediately of another object as term (about this in distinction 36 [I d.36 q. un n.9]).

In another way. I concede b and c is not lost, because the production of the second object in known existence is not real production, just as neither does the term receive real existence, - therefore it is a diminished production, just as the product is a diminished being; such production can exist, because it is not production but quasi-production; of this sort is knowledge. Therefore the Father in himself, through the knowledge in which the second object is virtually, quasi-produces in himself that object while he actually knows it and, when communicating the knowledge, communicates it as quasi-producing the same object, because it is posterior to the person to whom it is communicated; therefore the Trinity quasi-produces the object, and so produces it in known existence (because to be produced in that is to be quasi-produced), although only the Father really produces in the Son, by force of generation, and the Father and Son in the Holy Spirit communicate knowledge of this sort of object, - which knowledge (communicated in all of them) is a quasi-production, and so a diminished production. - In another way, more plainly: to be knowledge of the second object is to produce it in known being, just as to be knowledge of the first object is to be of it as of quasi-producing knowledge, because the first object is quasi-presupposed and the second is quasi-produced by it - in act -because it is knowledge of it; therefore, as really communicating knowledge as of the second object, it really communicates it as producing the secondary object, by the production which there is possible, which is only a diminished production.

Whether the Father or the Trinity produces the second object in known existence, d is not lost, because the idea is a second object, whether produced in this way or in that, or it is not produced but quasi-produced. - And if someone says that the idea is not thus really referred to God’s knowing, because thus the idea is nothing, - by parity of reasoning neither conversely does knowing have any relation of reason to the second object, because the second object is altogether nothing, just as it neither founds nor terminates any relation.

Nor is e lost, because from whatever source the second object is produced (or quasi-produced), the divine person has perfect existence, comparing the intellect and will to the first object; however I do concede that the Word, from the quasi-secondary production, is really produced knowledge of the creature, just as the Father is quasi-secondarily unproduced knowledge of it, and so necessarily the Son, like the Father, is knowledge of it - but this relation neither with non-generation constitutes the Father, nor with generation the Son.

From this f [is not lost - i.e. repeat of the Holy Spirit what has just been said of the Son]; - or it can be asserted of being well-pleased; insofar as the ‘shown thing’ is shown to have goodness participated from the First thing; or in another way; just as the person of the Father necessarily has the operation of the will, which operation is of some object necessarily and of another contingently, - so he produces a subsistent quasioperation, which operation, necessarily produced, is of some object necessarily and of another contingently; and just as this does not follow ‘the volition of the creature is the same as the person of the Father, therefore the Father necessarily has volition of the creature’ (but only this follows ‘therefore he necessarily has a volition that is of the creature’), so this does not follow ‘the Father necessarily inspirits volition of the creature’ (in the composite sense), although he necessarily inspirits a ‘voition’ which is of the creature.

Note that above, when it is said [at the beginning of this annotation]: ‘On the contrary. The same thing is principle’, contradictory responses are seen; one, that together with infinite will one must take the fact that it has a present infinite object, - the other, afterwards, that one should add nothing to the object, but from infinite will is deduced an infinite object always actually present, necessarily (and how it is deduced is contained here [footnote to n.49]).

But this contradiction is thus removed: from the idea of power is deduced the condition of the first object and of its presence, not by a ‘proof-why’ but by a ‘proof-that’; for the idea of power requires an object that is a quasi-co-principle with respect to the operation, and so, in order to have a complete ‘proof-why’ of necessary love, one must take it thus, ‘infinite will possessing an infinite object actually presented to it through the intellect’, -and the first response is understood in this way; but of this whole ‘proof-why’, including the two co-principles (necessarily being co-principles of the act) the one part proves the other part by a ‘proof-that’, - and the second response is understood in this way.

Nor does the proof ‘So in this way’ [footnote to n.49] conclude more: for the subject of the first proposition does not state the whole ‘proof-why’ with respect to the predicate, but the other principle does - from whose idea, however, is deduced that the remaining co-principle concurs not as to ‘proof-why’, but nature thus requires that to such a will there correspond a proportionate co-principle, therefore an infinite one, and in a proportionate way, therefore always present; for example, according to Aristotle ‘some cause simply necessary moves the heavens’ [I d.8 n.251]; here in the subject there is a partial ‘proof-why’ of the predicate, but nature requires that to it there correspond a proportionate co-principle and in a proportionate way, - as a necessary heavens and necessarily present and movable; therefore the total ‘proof-why’ of this effect - namely of the necessary motion - includes the active cause and the movable thing, but from the proper idea of one of these there is concluded, by a ‘proof-that’, that the other concurs, and so the effect is proved, but by a diminished ‘proof-that’.

[From the Cambridge Reportatio]

Point F. [See n.25]

Further, when things are so disposed that they join together as ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ for some action, the one that is ‘prior’ joins in more principally for the action; but the essence, which is the nature (insofar as they [Henry and his followers] take ‘nature’ in the first mode [n.13]), in which the three divine persons consist, is prior to the will; therefore if nature joins in for the action in this way, as assisting the will, it will necessarily be more principal in this production; therefore a contradiction is involved in its joining in as assistant, concomitant to the will, and not, as they themselves say, preceding it.

Point G. [See n.62]

Concerning the tenth distinction, where the Master [Lombard] determines what one must see if the divine will is the principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit, - and because there are three things that cause difficulty, namely the consubstantiality of the product, the necessity of the production, the apparent incompossibility of liberty and necessity, therefore I ask three brief questions about these three points; the first is whether the divine will can be per se a principle of communicating the divine nature; second, whether it can be per se a principle of producing necessarily; third, whether necessity and liberty are compatible with each other in the very same respect of the same production. Fourth -the principal question - whether the divine will is per se the principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit.

To the first question it is argued no: Averroes Physics 8 com.46, ‘Whether each thing’ [I d.2 nn.212-214].

Again, the common description of nature is convertible with it.

Again, the image is the principle in artificial things.

On the contrary: the will is not less perfect than the memory.

As to the second question it is argued no: Aristotle Metaphysics 9.2.1046b4-11, a rational power is to opposites.

Again, the ways of being a principle are opposed.

On the contrary: that which is perfect in production is not repugnant to the production of a perfective productive principle.

As to the third question it is argued no in this way: the necessity of a principle naturally determines necessarily; therefore the principle is from its nature necessarily determined; therefore by natural necessity.

Again, necessary dominion does not dominate [sc. cannot determine itself to this or that], otherwise anything natural would be called free.

On the contrary: perfection in productive principle is not repugnant to a perfect productive principle.

To the fourth question it is argued no: as doing and making are, so are operation and production.

Again, it would be precognitive.

On the contrary: the Master [Lombard] Sentences I d.10 ch.2 n.102, through Jerome On Psalm 14 [=Abelard, Christian Theology IV: “Hence there is this from Jerome on psalm XVII: ‘The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor the Son but the love which the Father has in the Son and the Son in the Father’.”], and Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.5 n.7, and Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity VI ch.17.